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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the effect of major cuts to housing subsidies on property 
prices in England. Governments commonly give rental subsidies to poor households, 
but it is not known whether or to what extent this distorts underlying property prices. 
Using a difference-in-differences-type estimator to exploit variation in scale of the cuts 
across local areas, we find that the cuts lowered house prices from the time of the policy 
announcement. The impact was seen predominantly for types of property typically 
rented by recipients of subsidies and in areas where demand for housing is low relative 
to supply. Analysis of survey data of individuals finds that benefit recipients were more 
likely to move home after the cuts relative to other renters. Overall, the results suggest 
that rental subsidies, while helping recipients to afford otherwise too expensive 
properties, could contribute to affordability problems for buyers.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Housing rental subsidies are a common and big-ticket welfare policy for governments 
seeking to address concerns about the affordability of housing for low-income families.  
In the United Kingdom this subsidy is the second largest item of welfare expenditure - 
it comprised over 3% of all government spending in 2011/12, making it a greater 
expenditure than unemployment benefits and smaller only than the state pension.  Any 
intervention on this scale to subsidise the demand for housing is likely to lead to 
distortions in the housing market. However, there is currently little evidence on how 
changes to rental subsidies might have unintended impacts on the prices of the 
underlying assets, i.e. the properties. In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap in the 
literature by investigating the effect of government reforms that cut housing subsidies 
in England in 2011, and in doing so we examine the possibility of a difficult public 
policy trade-off. Housing benefits can enable recipients to rent certain properties that 
they otherwise could not afford, but at the same time they might increase property prices 
and affect the affordability of owner-occupied housing.  
A number of previous studies have analysed the impact of housing subsidies on 
rental prices.  Evidence from the UK (Gibbons and Manning, 2006), the USA (Susin, 
2002, Eriksen and Ross, 2015), France (Fack, 2006) and Finland (Kangasharju, 2010, 
and Viren, 2013) suggests that rents generally increase with the availability of more 
generous subsidies – in the case of Eriksen and Ross (2015) primarily due to subsidy 
recipients choosing more expensive accommodation.  However, while the majority of 
these papers draw a consistent link between housing subsidies and rental prices, the 
relationship between subsidies and property prices has been rarely examined.  In fact, 
the only direct evidence of a link between housing subsidies and property prices is 
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Rydell et al. (1982), who analyse both the rental and sales price effects of the Housing 
Assistance Supply Experiment, a decade-long experiment that gave housing allowance 
payments to eligible households in two US towns. Their findings point towards a fairly 
moderate increase in house prices, mainly due to the housing allowance causing a small 
increase in demand. 
A link between housing subsidies and property prices follows straightforwardly 
from equilibrium asset price models in which current prices are a function of expected 
returns (Case and Shiller, 1989; Clayton, 1996; Ayuso and Restoy, 2006). Reductions 
in subsidies will lower expected rents and hence depress property prices.  This will 
happen if the incidence of the subsidy cuts falls directly on landlords who have been 
forced to reduce rents (see, for example, the evidence by Gibbons and Manning, 2006), 
if recipients fall into arrears with greater probability, or if tenants are forced to move 
into cheaper accommodation and properties are vacant more frequently.  The price 
changes following these effects are also likely to extend beyond tenanted properties to 
the wider housing market, as rents and the value of owner-occupation are intrinsically 
linked, with the latter serving as a hedge against rent rises (Sinai and Souleles, 2005).   
In this paper we exploit a reform to housing subsidies in England, known as 
Housing Benefit (and henceforth HB). Two major changes to HB were announced in 
June 2010 to come into effect from April 2011.  These were a cap on the maximum 
benefits a household can receive for a property of a certain size and a reduction in the 
reference rent used to calculate recipients’ maximum benefit entitlement from the local 
median rent to the 30th percentile. The latter change was expected to affect the majority 
(83%) of benefit recipients with an average loss of approximately 7% of HB per 
recipient (Department of Work and Pensions, 2010).  
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To analyse the effect of these changes on property prices, we exploit variation 
in the proportion of HB recipients across the 325 local government authorities in 
England. Property markets with fewer recipients prior to the changes can be expected 
to be less affected by the cuts. This enables the use of a difference-in-differences style 
estimator in which differences in treatment intensity across local housing markets give 
the necessary cross-sectional variation to identify the effects of the treatment.  
Supplementary evidence suggests that the identification strategy is valid.  
The results show that the reforms had a negative and economically large effect 
on house prices in England. This effect immediately followed the policy announcement, 
suggesting that prices adjusted to expectations of lower rental returns, and this result is 
consistent across different specifications. There is also evidence that the reforms had a 
lasting effect on prices, with the impact continuing to be felt through 2013, more than 
two years after the policy announcement.  
We find that the impact of the reforms is greatest for the types of property most 
commonly rented by HB recipients, flats, and that it is sensitive to the conditions of 
local property markets. These vary enormously across England (Maclennan and Tu 
1996), as can be seen from Figure 1, which plots average price developments over time 
in London, other metropolitan areas and non-metropolitan areas. A striking feature of 
many local housing markets in the UK, especially in London, is the existence of excess 
demand as strict planning laws and factors such as topography mean that growth in the 
supply of housing is continually outpaced by the growth in demand (Cameron et al., 
2006; Cheshire and Hilber, 2008; Hilber and Vermeulen, 2015). In areas of high excess 
demand the reforms may be expected to have little effect on house prices as benefit 
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recipients for whom rents become unaffordable will be displaced by non-subsidised 
renters or landlords will be able to sell the property to owner-occupiers.1 
 
(FIGURE 1 HERE) 
 
To examine this, we test whether the treatment effect varies with a simple 
indicator of local excess demand, the proportion of the local housing stock that is 
vacant. Our findings suggest that the negative effect of the cuts is indeed stronger in 
markets with higher vacancy rates.  
Of course, the finding that the reduction in rental subsidies reduced house prices 
only implies the existence of a public policy trade-off if the cuts also adversely affected 
HB recipients. To investigate this we use data from Understanding Society, a large 
household panel for the UK, to examine the moving behaviour of HB recipients. We 
find some evidence that the reforms increased the likelihood of HB recipients moving 
house relative to other renters, which suggests that the cuts also had an effect on the 
affordability of rental properties for low-income households.  
Overall, the results suggest the existence of a policy trade-off in which 
providing assistance to help recipients to live in properties (and areas) that they could 
otherwise not afford also contributes to higher property prices, and thus helps to fuel 
the affordability problem they are trying to address.  
The paper proceeds as follows. A full description of the reform and the general 
structure of Housing Benefits can be found in section 2. Section 3 and 4 focus on the 
                                                        
1 Reductions in HB might even increase house prices if low-income households are priced out of 
neighbourhoods and spillover effects then make these areas more desirable, i.e. if they stimulate a process 
of gentrification, such as that modelled by Guerrieri et al. (2013).  Recent empirical work has found 
evidence of these externalities affecting housing prices (Rossi-Hansberg et al., 2010; Autor et al., 2014). 
However, as we have data on HB recipients at the local authority level only, it is not possible to 
empirically identify such neighbourhood gentrification effects in this study.   
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first part of our investigation – the link between housing benefits and property prices, 
while section 5 considers the effect of the cuts on moving behaviour by benefit 
recipients. Conclusions are given in section 6. 
 
2. HOUSING BENEFIT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Housing Benefit in the UK is payable to low-income individuals and couples who rent 
their homes.  It can cover up to 100% of a tenant’s rent, but it is means-tested and 
capped at a maximum amount. The means-test involves the withdrawal of the subsidy 
at a taper rate of 65% on all income exceeding a threshold level that varies according 
to household circumstances, so that the HB received by each household is: 
 
HB = min (r, HBmax) if y ≤ y* or HB = min (r, HBmax) – 0.65 (y – y*) if y > y* (1)
  
where y is the household income, y* is the threshold income, r is the rent, and HBmax is 
the maximum amount that will be paid.  Approximately two-thirds of recipients are 
eligible for the maximum amount (Brown and Hood, 2012) and the maximum that can 
be claimed by tenants in the private rental sector is determined by Local Housing 
Allowance (LHA) rates. These LHA rates increase in the number of bedrooms, but fix 
payments for same-size properties within the same local rental market. The LHA rates 
for each local rental market are determined by a Rent Officer and until April 2011 these 
were set to be the median rental price for properties in the local market. 
In June 2010, the UK government announced changes to HB affecting tenants 
in private accommodation in England and Wales from April 2011.  The changes were 
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announced by a new government immediately following a general election and had not 
been trailed in advance.  The main reforms were: 
 The LHA to be set at the 30th percentile of local rents rather than the 50th 
percentile. 
 The maximum LHA payable for each property size to be capped at an absolute 
amount instead of being purely dependent on market rents. The caps are £250 a 
week for a one-bedroom property (including shared accommodation), £290 a 
week for a two-bed, £340 a week for a three-bed and £400 a week for a four-
bed. Furthermore, the LHA band for 5-bedroom properties was abolished, with 
4 bedrooms becoming the new maximum.  
These changes applied immediately for new claims and on the anniversary of the claim 
plus a nine-month transitional period for existing recipients.  This means that the 
reforms applied to all recipients by December 2012 as the latest affected case would be 
someone whose claim was made in March 2011, placing the anniversary in March 2012 
and the end of the 9-month transition period in December 2012.  
It was estimated that the setting of LHA rates at the 30th percentile would affect 
83% of LHA cases, with an average loss of approximately 7% per recipient 
(Department of Work and Pensions, 2010).  The impact was expected to vary across 
regions, with London having the lowest proportion of affected claimants (71%) and 
Humber the greatest (90%), but the average expected loss of those affected was 
relatively constant across all regions, being always within the 6.5 – 8.5% range. The 
benefit cap was set at a level above rental prices in most local markets and was predicted 
to affect only 2% of HB recipients.  The majority of those affected are recipients living 
in London, but for whom this would be a very large reduction.  For example, the LHA 
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rate for a 3-bedroom property in the Central London rental market area pre-reform was 
£700.00 per week, but this was reduced to £340.00.  
Further measures affecting HB recipients in the private rented sector were also 
announced in June 2010.  These mostly reinforce the impact of the two measures 
outlined above by further reducing subsidies, but are either smaller in scale, such as 
increased non-dependent deductions and an increased upper age limit from 25 to 35 
years old at which the recipient should live in shared accommodation, or were 
introduced at a later date, such as linking LHA increases to the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) instead of changes to real local market rents from April 2013.  The latter can be 
expected to cut subsidies over time since rental prices typically increase faster than 
general inflation.  A final reform was the scrapping of an excess of up to £15 per week 
paid to recipients renting properties at rates below the LHA.  The abolition of the excess 
removes an incentive for renters to search for lower rents, which could work against 
the other subsidy changes.  However, the Department for Work and Pensions argue that 
the incentive was ineffective (Department of Work and Pensions, 2011), and there is 
no evidence to the contrary.2 
Other welfare reforms were also announced in the June 2010 budget that 
tightened the eligibility criteria for some benefits and abolished others.  Most 
prominently, these were changes to child benefits for higher-earners and changes to the 
disability living allowance. In principle, these other changes could cause problems for 
our analysis as they might lead to further income shocks for HB recipients. A 
precondition for this is an overlap between the target groups for these reforms and HB 
recipients. To gauge the potential impact of these other reforms, we used data from 
                                                        
2 The introduction of the so-called “bedroom tax” (or, officially, the removal of the “spare room 
subsidy”), whereby households with spare bedrooms lose between 14% (one spare bedroom) and 25% 
(two or more spare bedrooms) of their housing benefits, was a well-publicised and controversial change 
to housing subsides, but affects tenants in social (state-owned) housing only. 
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wave 1 of “Understanding Society” (see section 4.3 for details on the data). Child 
benefits and child tax credits are claimed by 42% and 37% of all HB recipients. 
However, the announced changes to these benefits only affected those with an annual 
income of at least £40,000.3 In our sample, this amounts to 0.5% of all HB recipients, 
which suggests that bias from these reforms is negligible. Disability living allowance 
is claimed by 18% of all HB recipients. However, changes to this benefit did not come 
into effect before April 2013, which is at the end of our observation period and suggests 
that any bias from this benefit change should be small.  
Aside from these welfare reforms, the June 2010 budget held other fiscal 
measures aimed at reducing the government’s deficit. These included a two-year pay 
freeze for public sector workers on medium and upper incomes and an announcement 
that from 2011 the measure of inflation used to uprate welfare payments would change 
from the Retail Price Index to the, typically lower, Consumer Price Index. We present 
further econometric evidence in the following sections, which suggests that these 
contemporaneous reforms do not drive our results. 
 
3. MODELING THE EFFECT OF HOUSING BENEFIT CUTS ON PROPERTY 
PRICES 
 
The analysis investigates the impact of the benefit reform on property prices and is 
conducted on the level of local authorities. Although the benefit reforms affected the 
whole of the UK, due to data restrictions we have to restrict the sample to England, 
which leaves 325 local authorities. The property data come from HM Land Registry, 
which is the central registry for all landowners in England (and Wales). The specific 
                                                        
3 The actual implementation of the changes to child benefits used an even higher threshold of £50,000. 
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data used here is the ‘price paid data’ recording final transaction prices, which is 
publicly available from 1995 onwards.4 We use a sample covering all property 
transactions in England from January 2009 (i.e., after the crash of Lehman Brothers and 
the resulting nationwide drop in house prices) until December 2013, which gives a total 
of 3,006,801 transactions. The data contain information on the full address of each 
property, the price paid, the date of the transaction, the property type (flat, terraced 
house, semi-detached house or detached house), whether the property is newly built 
and whether the property is freehold or leasehold. We also merge this data with 
information that we use in parts of the analysis. These are the pre-reform proportion of 
vacant dwellings per local authority from the Department for Communities and Local 
Government and the pre-reform proportions of unemployed and public sector workers 
and recipients of other benefits. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the estimation 
sample. 
 
(TABLE 1 HERE) 
 
Data on property prices over time are insufficient to identify the effect of the 
HB reforms as the effect would be confounded by general time trends or potentially the 
effects of other policies enacted around the same time. As Figure 2 shows, the changes 
were announced in a month with high transaction prices and came into effect in a month 
with very low transaction prices, followed by another increase. While part of this effect 
could be due to the policy changes, part of it is likely due to changes in other factors 
                                                        
4 See http://www.landregistry.gov.uk/public/information/public-data/price-paid-data. There is no 
equivalent house ‘price paid’ data available for Scotland or Northern Ireland. Furthermore, their legal 
frameworks around housing markets are markedly different from England, which raises doubts about 
their suitability for comparability. Data on vacant dwellings was not available for Wales. 
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affecting house prices that occur at the same time. 
 
(FIGURE 2 HERE) 
 
Further, since this is a nationwide change to benefits there is no clear control 
region that can be considered to be fully unaffected by the changes. However, the extent 
to which a local property market is affected will depend on the number of HB recipients 
relative to the total population. To exploit this cross-sectional variation, the property 
data is merged with local authority-level information on the share of HB recipients in 
the total population directly before the announcement of the reform in May 2010. 
Fixing the share of recipients at some pre-reform level is necessary, since shares may 
change due to the reforms and the use of later shares might lead to endogeneity 
problems.  
The empirical approach is a difference-in-differences-type estimator with a 
continuously varying treatment intensity, similar to those commonly used in the 
evaluation of nationwide minimum wages (e.g., Card, 1992; Dolton et al., 2012, 2015). 
Specifically, we estimate versions of the following equation: 
,**'
4
1
ilrtPl
P
Pirtlilrt THBRXY   

   (2) 
where Yilrt is the (log) price of property i in local authority l in government office region 
r in month t.5 Equation (2) summarises our basic estimating equation including local 
authority fixed effects (l), government office region-month fixed effects (rt), i.e., non-
parametric time trends by region, and property characteristic controls (Xi). We also 
estimate simpler specifications that exclude all of the previously mentioned controls 
                                                        
5 Adopting the former Government Office classifications, we have nine English regions. 
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and more comprehensive versions that include local authority-specific linear time 
trends, the local unemployment rate, local shares of public sector employment, and the 
proportion of local populations in receipt of other types of benefit as a robustness check. 
HBRl is the share of the population in local authority l who received HB in May 2010, 
which gives the necessary cross-sectional variation in the benefit changes. This is 
interacted with a vector of dummy variables for four time periods, TP.  These are the 
period following the announcement of the reforms, but before they came into effect, 
i.e. July 2010 to March 2011, and three subsequent periods, April to December 2011, 
January to December 2012, and January to December 2013.  We define four time 
periods as the announcement of the reform may immediately cause changes in prices if 
expected future rents fall or some HB recipients may move in anticipation of the 
changes, while allowing the treatment effect to vary by time in the post-reform period 
acknowledges that increasing numbers of recipients are affected by the changes over 
time. By the last time period all HB recipients are affected by the reform. The 
parameters of interest are 𝜏𝑃, which give the effect of the reform in period P when the 
share of HB recipients in the local population increases by one additional percentage 
point. 
It is important to be clear about the main threats to identification in a treatment 
intensity-based difference-in-difference setting. The main worry in a case such as ours 
are potential other changes over time that are correlated with the pre-reform share of 
housing benefit recipients HBRl. For example, a general change in expectations 
regarding further government policies would only matter if it affects regions with a high 
proportion of HB recipients differently from those with fewer HB recipients. We can 
think of a range of potential confounding effects that might be problematic in this 
context. Firstly, it is possible that the proportion of HB recipients is higher in certain 
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local authorities (for example, housing benefits recipients are more common in certain 
cities). We include local authority fixed effects to control for this possibility. Secondly, 
it is possible that HBR is correlated with unobserved trends on the local authority or 
regional level. In our more comprehensive specifications, we include both 
region*month-of-year FEs and local authorities to account for this possibility. Thirdly, 
it is possible that other government reforms affecting other benefit recipients might 
affect house prices in a similar way that the housing benefit cuts, which would be 
problematic if the proportion of other benefit recipients in an area was correlated with 
HBRl. To allow for this possibility, we estimate a specification that includes further 
interactions between the (pre-reform) share of other benefit recipients and the post-
treatment dummies, specifically the proportions of people receiving income support, 
job seekers allowance, incapacity benefits, employment and support allowance, carer’s 
allowance and pension credits. We also allow for the effects of general austerity by 
introducing further interactions with the respective pre-reform employment in the 
private and public sector and also control for the local unemployment rate. Finally, it is 
possible that HB recipients cluster in specific areas of cities, which could introduce a 
correlation between HBRl and unobserved housing quality and amenities. To allow for 
this possibility we also present results from a specification that restricts the sample to 
streets with multiple purchases and replaced local authority with street fixed effects. 
Since there are comparatively high number of groups that are treated with 
different intensity, we are able to cluster standard errors at the level of the local 
authorities, i.e., at the level at which the treatment varies, to avoid the Moulton-problem 
(Moulton, 1986). This approach also accounts for the problems with autocorrelation in 
difference-in-differences estimators described by Bertrand et al. (2004).  
Figure 3 presents a simple comparison of property price trends by local 
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authorities, which are grouped into quintiles based on the share of recipients. It shows 
that prices are always higher in local authorities with fewer recipients.  Pre-reform 
trends are broadly similar, although a price spike can be observed in late 2009/early 
2010 in local authorities with lower shares of recipients. The timing of these spikes 
corresponds to a change to a property transaction tax.  This transaction tax, known as 
“stamp duty”, was levied at a variable rate increasing in the value of the property of up 
to a maximum of 7%.  Until changes in December 2014 – which are not relevant for 
this paper – stamp duty began at a 1% rate on properties above the threshold value of 
£125,000. However, between September 2008 and December 2009 the threshold level 
was temporarily raised to £175,000, a so-called “stamp-duty holiday”.  Higher mean 
prices are generally observed in December 2009 suggesting that transactions of 
properties worth more than £125,000 were pushed through to take advantage of the tax 
break. As we can see from Figure 3, the extent of this varied across local authorities. 
 
 (FIGURE 3 HERE) 
 
This evidence of unconditional pre-existing trends is not necessarily a threat to 
identification if they disappear after conditioning on the various fixed effects and other 
controls that are included in our preferred specification. To test whether these 
differences persist in this specification, the interactions in (2) were replaced with 
interactions between the share of HB recipients and each month from 2009 until 2013. 
This specification, which closely follows an idea by Autor (2003), effectively includes 
leads and lags of the treatment effect.6 Ideally, all interactions prior to the 
announcement should be small and insignificant. Figure 4 plots these interactions along 
                                                        
6 See Angrist and Pischke, 2009, pp. 178-180, for a textbook treatment. 
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with 95%-confidence bounds using July 2010 as the base. The estimated coefficients 
are generally quite small and statistically insignificant, although there is again a 
relatively pronounced spike at the time the stamp holiday ended and a noticeably lower 
point estimate for the following month. 
 
(FIGURE 4 HERE) 
 
Therefore, to address potential problems arising from these differences, we use 
two alternative sample definitions in addition to the full sample from January 2009. The 
first simply omits all transactions prior to February 2010, so that it excludes the last 
month of the stamp holiday as well as the following month. In this sample, the pre-
treatment period ranges from February until June 2010 with the other periods 
unchanged from the base estimates. However, there is also a potential concern 
regarding the comparability of the pre- and post-periods, as we compare February to 
June pre-reform with full years post reform. To address this problem, we form a further 
(and preferred) sample that includes only February to June in each year. In this sample, 
the pre-reform period ranges from February to June 2010, the announcement period 
covers February and March 2011 and the post-enactment period cover April to June in 
2011 and February to June in both 2012 and 2013. While all of the above specifications 
yield similar results, we present additional analyses based on the third sample definition 
and our most comprehensive specification. 
Additionally, it is possible that the stamp duty holiday had an impact on the 
timing of house purchases and thus the volume of transactions, as some transactions 
might have been brought forward to benefit from the stamp duty holiday. Note that we 
cannot simply include the number of transactions in the main regressions as both the 
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volume of transactions and their price are market equilibrium outcomes and thus jointly 
determined. Figure 5 plots the number of housing transactions for various types of 
properties and three price groups. The stamp duty holiday should mainly affect property 
transactions with prices between £125,000 and £175,000 as these could benefit from 
the reduction in stamp duty. Figure 5 indeed suggests a spike in the number of 
transactions in this price category right before the end of the stamp duty holiday and a 
corresponding drop in transactions the following month. After this the number of 
transactions appears to return to a normal level, suggesting that the impact of the stamp 
duty holiday was short-term. This finding is also in line with evidence by a more formal 
analysis of the stamp duty holiday by Besley et al. (2014). 
 
(FIGURE 5 HERE) 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
Table 2 presents base estimates for the whole country based on a variety of sample 
definitions and specifications. Columns (i) to (vi) are based on the whole sample from 
January 2009. Column (i) is the most basic specification that just includes local 
authority fixed effects and dummies for the pre-treatment and the various post-
treatment periods. In columns (ii) and (iii) these broad time effects are replaced with 
either month-year effects or region-month-year effects. Column (iv) adds property 
characteristics, column (v) adds local authority linear time trends and column (vi) adds 
the local unemployment rate as well as interactions between the treatment period 
dummies and the pre-reform shares of other benefit recipients and private and public-
sector employment. The results are consistent across all of these columns, with the 
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estimates being robust to the inclusion of all additional controls. Columns (vi) and (vii) 
are based on the same specification as column (v), but use the alternative sample 
definitions discussed in section 3. Our preferred specification is column (vii) that uses 
the most comparable sample to the pre-treatment period and that is uncontaminated by 
any potential impact of the stamp duty holiday. Finally, column (ix) restricts the sample 
to streets with multiple purchases and replaces the local authority fixed effects with 
street fixed effects. 
 
(TABLE 2 HERE) 
 
Overall, the results suggest that property prices initially fell after the changes 
were announced, i.e. during the period 07/2010 to 03/2011, and remained at this lower 
level for the rest of 2011. To judge the economic significance of these results, one can 
compare how prices change for typical variation in the share of HB recipients across 
local authorities, for example, for a one standard deviation change (equivalent to 2.6 
percentage points). The results are economically large, where significant, with prices 
dropping between approximately 0.5 (for a coefficient value of 0.002 in column (v)) 
and 1.6% (for a value of 0.06 in column(viii)) following a one standard deviation 
increase in the number of HB recipients. The results are consistent across all three 
samples and the immediate impact of the policy announcement on prices offers support 
for the contention that prices are determined by expected returns to property ownership. 
From 2012 onwards the picture diverges depending on the sample used. In the 
more comparable samples using similar time periods in each year and avoiding the 
possible distortion through the stamp duty holiday in 2009, the point estimates remain 
negative and suggest a lasting decrease in house prices. In the case of the most 
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restrictive sample, including transactions in February and June of each year only, prices 
are estimated to continue to decrease, with the point estimate indicating that a one 
standard deviation increase in the number of HB recipients is associated with 
approximately a 0.8% (0.029*2.6, column (ix)) to a 3.4% (0.013*2.6, column (viii)) 
fall in house prices by 2013, although the latter estimates are only marginally 
statistically significant. By contrast, the less comparable full sample suggests that the 
impact of the cuts had only a temporary effect and there was no impact on prices from 
2012 onwards. Given the comparability problems with the full sample, it seems 
advisable to put more trust in the estimates in column (viii). 
 
(TABLE 3 HERE) 
 
If the effects in table 2 are indeed due to changes to housing benefits, they 
should be stronger for properties that are more likely to be rented rather than occupied 
by the owners, and especially so for properties more likely to be rented by HB 
recipients. Table 3 shows ownership status and HB receipt by accommodation types 
using data from the 2010/11 English Housing Survey. It shows that the majority of 
houses are occupied by owners, while flats are predominantly occupied by renters and 
HB recipients, so that we should find the strongest price effects on flats. 
 
(TABLE 4 HERE) 
 
This is investigated in Table 4, which repeats the estimates from table 2 
separated by property type. Given the differences between the London property market 
and the rest of the UK, we also present separate estimates for these regions. The 
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estimates show that the HB reform had a negative impact on the prices for flats outside 
of London, but that little effect is found for flats in London or for any other property 
type anywhere in England. London is arguably the tightest housing market in the UK 
with demand regularly outstripping supply, and these estimates point towards local 
housing market conditions being important for whether the benefit cuts had an impact 
on property prices.  
Given these findings, it seems worthwhile to investigate the role of local market 
conditions further. In particular, a high level of excess demand would make it easier for 
landlords to replace tenants, thus lowering the risk of income losses from vacancies and 
also providing less of an incentive to lower rents in response to the HB cuts. We test 
this idea directly by looking at treatment effect heterogeneity with respect to a direct 
indicator of excess demand, specifically the (pre-reform) share of local dwellings that 
are vacant, which has been found to be strongly negatively correlated with excess 
demand (Rydell, 1982). We use two different specifications. In the first, we simply test 
for treatment effect heterogeneity between local authorities with a vacancy rate above 
and below the median. The estimates can be found in the top panel of Table 5, which 
suggest that the HB cuts affected house prices only in those local authorities with a 
vacancy rate above the median where demand is expected to be less strong.  
 
(TABLE 5 HERE) 
 
In a second specification, we allow treatment effects to vary continuously with 
the vacancy rate. We centre this variable to a mean of zero for the interactions, which 
means that the base estimates give the treatment effect for a local authority with an 
average share of vacant dwellings. The estimates in the bottom panel Table 5 confirm 
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the results of the first specification: Effects are zero in local authorities with an average 
vacancy rate, but become more negative in markets with more vacant dwellings, i.e. 
those where demand can be expected to be low relative to supply. The interaction terms 
in the lower half of Table 5 are always negative and fairly substantial relative to the 
base effects. Overall, this pattern of results lends support to the idea that property prices 
suffer more from the HB cuts in areas where it is harder to replace benefit recipients 
with other tenants. 
 
5. EFFECTS ON BENEFIT RECIPIENTS’ MOVING BEHAVIOUR 
 
A possible consequence of the HB cuts is displacement of recipients if they cannot 
afford to stay in the same home after the cuts. HB recipients being forced to move into 
cheaper accommodation or areas might also help to explain the negative effects on 
property prices (if they cannot easily be replaced with other renters). To understand 
whether this is the case we use data from the first three waves of Understanding Society, 
a large annual panel survey of 40,000 households with three waves between January 
2009 and May 2013. The sample is restricted to individuals living in England at wave 
1 and to individuals renting their accommodation, which gives a sample of 35,210 
observations from 17,252 individuals. Three outcomes are considered: whether 
individuals would prefer to move house in the next year, whether they expect to move 
in the next year, and whether they have moved in the respective period. Descriptive 
statistics for this sample are presented in Table 6. It is important to be clear that the 
three periods in Table 6 do not correspond to waves and that the last wave is in fact 
spread over the periods “April 2011 to December 2011” and “after January 2012”, i.e., 
the drop in observations in the final period is not due to panel attrition. 
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(TABLE 6 HERE) 
 
Estimation is based on a simple difference-in-differences estimator of the general form 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜙𝑡 + ∑ 𝜏𝑃 ∗ 𝐻𝐵𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑃 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
3
𝑃=1 ,     (3) 
where i indexes individuals and t time. We estimate four specifications of (3). We 
always include month-year fixed effects (t) and estimate versions of (3) with and 
without individual fixed effects (i) and with and without interactions with dummies 
indicating the receipt of other benefits, specifically incapacity benefits, job seeker’s 
allowance, employment and support allowance, carer’s allowance and pension credits. 
We consider individuals to be treated when they received HB in wave 1 (marked by 
HBi).
7 We also use the information on other benefits from wave 1. As our preferred 
control group we use other renters not in receipt of HB. We also tried using all non-
recipients (i.e. including owner-occupiers) as an alternative control group. While 
including owner-occupiers leads arguably to a worse control group, as homeowners are 
less mobile than renters (e.g., Dielemann, Clark and Deurloo, 2000), the results were 
essentially unchanged. There are three treatment periods (denoted by Tp). We again 
distinguish between the announcement period and the remainder of 2011 to look at 
short run effects, but 2012 and 2013 are combined into a longer post-reform period due 
to the low number of observations in 2013. The estimation is carried out for two 
samples, London and the rest of the country.  
 
(TABLE 7 HERE) 
                                                        
7 It is again important to fix this at a pre-reform value as whether an individual is in receipt of HB in later 
waves could be influenced by the benefit changes. Furthermore information on HB is missing from wave 
3, making it both impossible and inadvisable to use a contemporaneous measure throughout. 
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Overall, we find somewhat mixed results, see Table 7, largely dependent on 
whether individual fixed effects are included. The differences in the estimates across 
specifications point towards some compositional changes in either treatment or control 
group that are correlated with moving behaviour. It seems likely that this is driven by 
compositional changes among the general population of renters, for example, due to 
differences in who has to move house for economic reasons, and as a consequence we 
place greater weight on the specifications with individual fixed effects. Focussing on 
these specifications, the estimates suggest, if anything, an increase in the proportion of 
people who prefer or expect to move in the post treatment periods, but the results rarely 
reach conventional levels of statistical significance either for London or elsewhere. 
However, in terms of actual moving behaviour, we find strong evidence for areas 
outside of London of housing benefit recipients moving house at higher rates than other 
renters following the HB cuts. The smaller results in London might be due to housing 
demand regularly outstripping supply, which makes any property moves difficult to 
accomplish.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper analyses the effect of a major cut to housing rental subsidies on property 
prices in England. Estimations are carried out using difference-in-differences-type 
estimators that exploit the fact that local authorities are differently affected by these 
changes depending on the number of HB recipients that lived there prior to the reform.  
Overall, we find that the benefit cuts lowered house prices by an economically 
meaningful magnitude, but that these effects were concentrated in flats, which are more 
 23 
likely to be rented by those on housing benefits, and had stronger negative effects on 
house prices in areas where demand is lower relative to supply. We also find some 
evidence that the benefit cuts led to HB recipients being more likely to move home than 
other renters.  In combination, these findings suggest a difficult public policy trade-off: 
Housing benefits enable recipients to rent certain properties that they otherwise could 
not afford, but at the same time they increase property prices, which affects the 
affordability of owner-occupied housing.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, property sample 
Variable Mean Std. 
dev. 
Min Max 
Ln(price) 12.14 0.63 8.52 17.82 
Price (£) 237,307 268,314 5,000 55 
million 
Transaction 07/2010 to 03/2011 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Transaction 04/2011 to 12/2011 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Transaction in 2012  0.18 0.39 0 1 
Transaction in 2013 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Newly build property 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Leasehold 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Detached house 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Flat 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Semi-detached house 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Share of housing benefit recipients in May 
2010 
7.29 2.63 2.51 16.22 
 - in London 9.57 3.12 5.00 16.22 
 - in metropolitan areas outside of London 8.40 2.57 2.51 13.54 
 - in non-metropolitan areas 6.18 1.81 2.59 12.47 
Share of property transactions in      
- London 14.2    
- outside London 85.8    
Avg. share of vacant properties 3.0 1.0 0.9 8.0 
 - in London 2.2 0.6 1.0 4.2 
 - in metropolitan areas outside of London 3.4 1.0 1.2 6.9 
 - in non-metropolitan areas 3.0 0.8 0.9 8.1 
Observations 3006801 
Source: Land Registry and Department of Work and Pension, Housing benefit caseload statistics. 
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Table 2: Base estimates, dependent variable: Ln(price) 
 Full sample from January 2009 Sample 
from 
February 
2010 
Sample from February 2010, only February to June 
transactions 
       All postcodes Only streets with 
multiple purchases 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) 
07/2010 to 03/2011 * % 
recipients in May 2010 
-0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005** -0.0025** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.0010) 
04/2011 to 12/2011 * % 
recipients in May 2010 
-0.003** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.006** -0.0028*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.008) 
2012 * % recipients in 
May 2010 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004*** -0.009* -0.0024** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.0011) 
2013 * % recipients in 
May 2010 
0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.004* -0.013* -0.0029** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.0013) 
Local authority fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Street fixed effects No No No No No No No No Yes 
Broad period dummies Yes No No No No No No No No 
Month-year dummies No Yes No No No No No No No 
Month-year*Region 
dummies 
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Property characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Local authority linear 
time trends 
No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Local unemployment 
rate 
No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public/private sector 
employment * 
treatment periods 
No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other benefit recipients 
* treatment periods 
No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3006801 3006801 3006801 3006801 3006801 3006801 2381954 954274 677997 
Notes: Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the local authority level in parentheses. */**/***denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively.
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Table 3: Ownership status and benefit receipt by accommodation type 
 Detached 
house 
Semi-detached 
house 
Terraced 
house 
Flat 
Owner-occupier 94.3% 76.4% 62.9% 27.0% 
Tenant, no housing 
benefit 
1.3% 11.6% 18.9% 36.0% 
Tenant, housing benefit 4.4% 11.9% 18.2% 37.0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: English Housing Survey 2010/11, authors’ own calculations. 
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Table 4: Estimates by property type 
 Preferred sample from February 2010, only February to June transactions 
 All England London Outside London 
Detached houses 
07/2010 to 03/2011 * % 
recipients in May 2010 
-0.0118* -0.0715 -0.0109* 
(0.0065) (0.1101) (0.0063) 
04/2011 to 12/2011 * % 
recipients in May 2010 
-0.0040 -0.0232 -0.0045 
(0.0071) (0.1287) (0.0070) 
2012 * % recipients in May 
2010 
-0.0123 -0.0223 -0.0131 
(0.0133) (0.2376) (0.0129) 
2013 * % recipients in May 
2010 
-0.0202 -0.0854 -0.0208 
(0.0199) (0.3581) (0.0193) 
Observations 220139 6843 213296 
Semi-detached houses 
07/2010 to 03/2011 * % 
recipients in May 2010 
0.0039 0.0359 0.0008 
(0.0042) (0.0415) (0.0043) 
04/2011 to 12/2011 * % 
recipients in May 2010 
0.0034 0.0850* -0.0009 
(0.0051) (0.0491) (0.0047) 
2012 * % recipients in May 
2010 
0.0073 0.1047 0.0006 
(0.0085) (0.0866) (0.0083) 
2013 * % recipients in May 
2010 
0.0119 0.1600 0.0009 
(0.0129) (0.1309) (0.0123) 
Observations 269086 21787 247299 
Terraced houses 
07/2010 to 03/2011 * % 
recipients in May 2010 
-0.0005 0.0395* -0.0057 
(0.0044) (0.0208) (0.0048) 
04/2011 to 12/2011 * % 
recipients in May 2010 
-0.0034 0.0341 -0.0081 
(0.0047) (0.0246) (0.0054) 
2012 * % recipients in May 
2010 
-0.0058 0.0692 -0.0150 
(0.0084) (0.0435) (0.0093) 
2013 * % recipients in May 
2010 
-0.0072 0.0873 -0.0190 
(0.0127) (0.0651) (0.0140) 
Observations 283706 39904 243802 
Flats 
07/2010 to 03/2011 * % 
recipients in May 2010 
-0.0073 0.0174 -0.0144* 
(0.0064) (0.0202) (0.0080) 
04/2011 to 12/2011 * % 
recipients in May 2010 
-0.0129* 0.0142 -0.0212** 
(0.0073) (0.0238) (0.0092) 
2012 * % recipients in May 
2010 
-0.0133 0.0212 -0.0303* 
(0.0122) (0.0422) (0.0155) 
2013 * % recipients in May 
2010 
-0.0162 0.0447 -0.0456* 
(0.0182) (0.0634) (0.0238) 
Observations 181343 71132 110211 
Notes: Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the local authority level in parentheses. 
*/**/***denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Estimates based on 
specification (viii) from table 2. 
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Table 5: Interactions with share of vacant dwellings in local authority, dependent variable: 
Ln(price) 
 Preferred sample from February 2010, 
only February to June transactions 
Specification 1: Vacancy rate above median 
Base estimates (vacancy rate below median), scaled by 1000 
07/2010 to 03/2011 * % recipients in May 2010 0.020 
 (0.158) 
04/2011 to 12/2011 * % recipients in May 2010 -0.020 
 (0.180) 
2012 * % recipients in May 2010 0.022 
 (0.320) 
2013 * % recipients in May 2010 0.048 
 (0.460) 
Interactions with vacancy rate above median, scaled by 1000 
07/2010 to 03/2011 * % recipients in May 2010 * vacancy 
rate above median (dummy) 
-0.006 
(0.050) 
04/2011 to 12/2011 * % recipients in May 2010 * vacancy 
rate above median (dummy) 
-0.080** 
(0.040) 
2012 * % recipients in May 2010 * vacancy rate above 
median (dummy) 
-0.158*** 
(0.040) 
2013 * % recipients in May 2010 * vacancy rate above 
median (dummy) 
-0.285*** 
(0.074) 
Specification 2: Interactions with centred vacancy rate 
Base estimates (scaled by 1000) 
07/2010 to 03/2011 * % recipients in May 2010 0.005 
 (0.169) 
04/2011 to 12/2011 * % recipients in May 2010 -0.100 
 (0.000179) 
2012 * % recipients in May 2010 -0.110 
 (0.321) 
2013 * % recipients in May 2010 -0.212 
 (0.426) 
Interactions with share of vacant dwellings (scaled by 1000) 
07/2010 to 03/2011 * % recipients in May 2010 * share of 
vacant buildings in year (centred) 
-0.038 
(0.036) 
04/2011 to 12/2011 * % recipients in May 2010 * share of 
vacant buildings in year (centred) 
-0.061** 
(0.029) 
2012 * % recipients in May 2010 * share of vacant 
buildings in year (centred) 
-0.088** 
(0.044) 
2013 * % recipients in May 2010 * share of vacant 
buildings in year (centred) 
-0.143** 
(0.060) 
Observations 954,374 
Notes: Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the local authority level in parentheses. 
*/**/***denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. All estimations also 
include the share of vacant buildings in a year and local authority (centred at mean). Estimates based on 
specification (viii) from table 2. 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics, individual sample 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Housing benefit recipient  0.27 0.44 0 1 
Observed 07/2010 to 03/2011 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Observed 04/2011 to 12/2011 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Observed after 01/2012 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Would like to move next year 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Expects to move next year 0.24 0.42 0 1 
Moved during observation period 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Observations 35,210 
Individuals 17,252 
Source: Understanding Society, Waves 1 to 3. 
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Table 7: Individual-level estimates on moving behaviour 
 London Outside London 
 Prefers to 
move within 
year 
Expects to 
move 
within 
year 
Moved 
within 
respective 
period 
Prefers to 
move 
within 
year 
Expects to 
move 
within 
year 
Moved 
within 
respective 
period 
Specification 1: Pooled OLS 
Recipient * 07/2010 
to 03/2011 
0.008 0.036 -0.042** -0.008 0.011 -0.002 
(0.027) (0.024) (0.021) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) 
Recipient * 04/2011 
to 12/2011 
0.060** 0.070*** -0.019 0.042** 0.036** -0.023** 
(0.030) (0.026) (0.016) (0.018) (0.014) (0.009) 
Recipient * 01/2012 
and later 
0.086** 0.121*** -0.034** 0.024 0.027* -0.037*** 
(0.034) (0.029) (0.017) (0.020) (0.016) (0.010) 
Specification 2: Individual Fixed Effects 
Recipient * 07/2010 
to 03/2011 
-0.016 0.012 -0.022 -0.035** -0.006 0.034*** 
(0.028) (0.027) (0.022) (0.017) (0.014) (0.012) 
Recipient * 04/2011 
to 12/2011 
0.052* 0.043 0.021 0.019 -0.013 0.049*** 
(0.031) (0.028) (0.021) (0.018) (0.015) (0.012) 
Recipient * 01/2012 
and later 
-0.003 0.043 0.057** 0.001 -0.001 0.113*** 
(0.036) (0.033) (0.025) (0.021) (0.018) (0.014) 
Specification 3: Pooled OLS, additional interactions with other benefits 
Recipient * 07/2010 
to 03/2011 
0.002 0.043* -0.028 -0.028* 0.004 0.007 
(0.028) (0.025) (0.022) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) 
Recipient * 04/2011 
to 12/2011 
0.046 0.074*** -0.013 0.029 0.043*** -0.016* 
(0.032) (0.028) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015) (0.009) 
Recipient * 01/2012 
and later 
0.074** 0.129*** -0.031* 0.011 0.038** -0.027*** 
(0.036) (0.030) (0.017) (0.022) (0.017) (0.010) 
Specification 4: Individual Fixed Effects, additional interactions with other benefits 
Recipient * 07/2010 
to 03/2011 
-0.008 0.013 -0.021 -0.036** -0.003 0.045*** 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.024) (0.018) (0.015) (0.013) 
Recipient * 04/2011 
to 12/2011 
0.059* 0.042 0.005 0.025 -0.003 0.049*** 
(0.033) (0.031) (0.024) (0.019) (0.016) (0.013) 
Recipient * 01/2012 
and later 
-0.012 0.038 0.041 0.001 0.013 0.110*** 
(0.039) (0.036) (0.027) (0.022) (0.019) (0.015) 
Observations 9,336 25,874 
Notes: Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual level in parentheses. All 
estimates contain month dummies */**/***denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. 
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Figure 1: Price developments over time by property market 
 
Source: Land Registry price paid data, own calculations.  
Note: The first solid line marks the time of the policy announcement, the second the time of the enactment. 
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Figure 2: Mean property prices over time 
 
Source: Land Registry price paid data, own calculations.  
Note: The first solid line marks the time of the policy announcement, the second the time of the enactment. 
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Figure 3: Mean property prices by quintiles of treatment variable 
 
Source: Land Registry price paid data; Department of Work and Pension, Housing benefit caseload 
statistics, own calculations. 
Note: The first solid line marks the time of the policy announcement, the second the time of the enactment. 
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Figure 4: Coefficient plot of monthly interactions with treatment variable 
 
Note: Coefficient estimates based on specification (vi) from table 2, but with monthly interactions. Base 
period is July 2010, where the coefficient is normalised to zero. The whiskers represent 95% confidence 
intervals. The first solid line marks the time of the policy announcement, the second the time of the 
enactment. 
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Figure 5: Property transactions by month, property type and price category 
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Source: Land Registry price paid data, own calculations. 
Note: The first solid line marks the time of the policy announcement, the second the time of the enactment. 
 
 
